As a preliminary to a survey of concepts of lay metalanguage, we can turn our attention to two examples of concepts of metalanguage as used by professional linguists, to provide a point of comparison for the subsequent discussion. TWO Three phrases are particularly revealing with regard to the boundary between phonetics and phonology: "perfectly pronounceable," "non-existent word-finally," and "a distortion of French phonology." "Perfectly pronounceable" is opposed phonetically to "perfectly unpronounceable," e.g. by the "law of three consonants" in French which prohibits clusters of more than three consonants. Thus, in rien de special [Rjtdspesjal] , dsp is "perfectly pronounceable"; whereas in quatre de speciales *[katdspesjal], the tdsp would be "perfectly [i.e. physically, articulatorily] unpronounceable."
"Non-existent word-finally" is not relevant to the same order of constraint, for there is nothing articulatorily difficult about pronouncing a word-final nd in French -as evidenced by the widespread pronunciation of weekend. be that statistics should be taken to exercise a certain power over the language. In the second interpretation, speakers themselves have power over their language, for an offensive arrangement will be consciously avoided. An irony here is that it has been clear for centuries that no precise correspondence exists between English spelling and pronunciation. The Great Vowel Shift wrought havoc; and after that, spelling reformers bravely but futilely sought to rectify the situation. Yet if this was known, and if one encountered a word whose pronunciation one did not know, it would be risky, not to say contradictory, to believe it reliable to base a correct pronunciation on the written word. Rather, the required strategy would be to seek the help of someone who seemed to know how to pronounce the word. The conclusion is that it may seem that one can "pronounce letters"; but one knows that a given letter is pronounceable only because the pronunciation exists already, quite apart from any written form. Thus a pronunciation would appear to be based not on letters, but rather on a tradition of pronunciation. It is for this reason that a so-called spelling pronunciation of words like pestle cannot be a coherent notion unless an accepted pronunciation is already in place. But this pronunciation itself would, ex hypothesi, not be based on spelling.
FIELD OBSERVATIONS OF SPEAKERS' REMARKS ON PRONUNCIATION
To these deployments of theoretical metalanguage, in trying to clarify what is involved in pronunciation, we may add another set of notions which emerge from problems of pronunciation in actual communicational exchanges. These are notions on which lay speakers have been observed to draw in the management of their daily communication. A fertile ground for doing this is provided by the city of New Orleans -in which, because of its French heritage, a large number of people have French names. However, because a knowledge of French phonetic habits has virtually disappeared there (though it has not among the Cajuns who live in the country), there is often room for confusion about how to pronounce a given name. Consequently, there is a frequent need for strategies to solve the communicational problem of how to pronounce a name which is either aurally or visually unfamiliar. Given these examples, any attempt to explain the phenomenon of pronunciation needs to take into account the relationship among (a) spelling, (b) oral performance of what is taken to be spelled, (c) aural (or cognitive) experience of that performance, (d) visual experience of spelling, and (e) the experience of having to perform something unfamiliar.
Categories of non-bearers' experience of names
To begin from the point of view of the person who does not bear the name, but must pronounce it, the perceptual field is divided into SOUND, WRITING, and RELATIONSHIP between the two. The pronouncer is also faced with the evident requirement to pronounce; however, this is not so much perceived as entered into as an act which, once begun, must take care of itself for better or worse (see below).
As for SOUND, the (English-speaking) hearer may recognize a sound as a familiar name, e.g. [smI0]. This will generally be regarded as posing no barrier to producing the name when required. However, the hearer may not rec- name in the list, and utters it. Readers/hearers would be facing a written form and the pronunciation simultaneously, but recognize neither. In this case hearers/readers may try to match the sound, and ignore the written form; or they may ignore the sound as hopeless, and attempt to pronounce the written form. There are two final strategies: Hearers/readers can negotiate the form (ask for a repetition, make attempts at it, ask for help etc.); or they can seek a way to avoid the issue and be silent.
The above offers an informal framework of ways in which non-bearers experience names they may have to pronounce. Pronunciation, however, must also be approached from the viewpoint of the bearer who, if the name is unfamiliar (as is often the case with French names in New Orleans), is in a position of either ignoring the situation entirely -which, for practical reasons, may not always be possible -or of having to manage the public use of the name.
Bearers' attitudes toward the pronunciation and mispronunciation of their names There are numerous aspects of the public management of name pronunciation. One of the first issues to face is the bearer's relationship to the name and/or its pronunciation. For example, it can happen that, if a wife is asked how she pronounces her name, she will say that the name is "really her husband's"; it cannot be assumed that they will pronounce it the same way. (It was a matter of public knowledge that a former mayor of New Orleans, Sidney Barthelemy, said [bar'0alami], whereas his wife said [bar 'Oelami]. His was virtually the universal public pronunciation of the name, yet one news anchorperson always used the wife's pronunciation.) One wife (Alexcee) said that her husband pronounced the name better than she did; another (Lepree) called into the background: "Honey, how do you pronounce our name?" Another thing which cannot be assumed is that every bearer is committed to one, or any, pronunciation. Some bearers actually avoid committing themselves to a pronunciation -waiting, e.g., to see how the interlocutor will pronounce it. The other category includes the rare bearer who finds the entire notion of mispronunciation offensive, and finds anyone who would bring it up offensively intrusive. One bearer of Dutreix objected to being asked if anyone mispronounced his name, and said: "If they make a mistake, they make a mistake. Don't worry about it!" Bearers' strategies for managing public pronunciation of their names Depending on bearers' attitudes toward the (mis)pronunciation of their names, they will inevitably be faced with having to put those attitudes to practical test. When this occurs, and assuming that the bearers do not simply ignore the situation, they will accordingly have recourse to various ways of conveying the pronunciation of the name. A vast majority of speakers proceed on the assumption that the, or a, pronunciation of their name can be conveyed to an interlocutor if they choose to convey it, whether to correct or simply to inform; a number of devices are revealed as being available for this purpose. Perhaps the most evident of these is the device of utterance or repetition. That is, the bearer takes it that the pronunciation can be learned or conveyed by the interlocutor's or bearer's saying it or repeating it. This can be done spontaneously. Or it may be done in response to the interlocutor asking for help (Jacquillon: "Most people don't even try to pronounce it, but will ask what it should be.") Finally, it may be done in response to an unsuccessful attempt at the name by the interlocutor. Thus Duquesnay: "They are usually struggling to pronounce it, and are happy for my assistance." A third device used by bearers is spelling. Some consider that the pronunciation can be conveyed merely by virtue of the interlocutor's seeing the spelled name. A name such as Duthu or Faucheaux is taken by its bearer to be "pronounced just like it's spelled." Or the bearer will actually spell out the name, thereby "conveying" the pronunciation, as in Viger: "v as in victory, i-g-e-r." Or the bearer, aware that the spelling of the name is not a sure guide to its pronunciation, will spell not the name but the name's envisioned pronunciation: Dupuy: "It's spelled d-u-p-u-y but pronounced d-u-p-w-e." Letters, however, can also be more consciously used as metalinguistic devices, instead of as mere items in spelling recitation. For example, the bearer of Casteix tells people, "The i is silent." If an interlocutor makes Castillon into a four-syllable name, the bearer will point out: "There is no i [after 11] in the name." Finally, the bearer may refer to the homophonous part of another word whose spelling is analogous to the corresponding part of the name, as in the case of Casbergue, whose bearer tells people it is "like catalogue: the g-u-e is [go]."
Often the entire problem of finding devices can be sidestepped by using a language-name as a metalinguistic term. Thus the pronunciation of Hezeau can be conveyed merely by saying, "It's a French name with a French ending." This is sometimes enough to ensure understanding. Another way of alluding to, and thereby conveying, the correct pronunciation is to eliminate a better-known but mistaken rival that sounds like it, as when the bearers of both Ardenaux and Ardeneaux say, "It's not Arceneaux." Given these considerations, we may tentatively define pronunciation as a notion which is used by speakers in daily communicational interaction: Pronunciation is a mode of utterance mediated for the speaker or the hearer by (i) the notion "how an item sounds" in conjunction with the notions "correct" and "incorrect," "good" and "bad"; and by (ii) the ways in which such a mode of utterance can be publicly managed.
Such a definition emphasizes that pronunciation is a normative conceptin which a certain category of physical activity is mediated by notions which speakers carry around with them, and in terms of which they interpret their experience. This is related to the Saussurean point that there can be no raw speech sound conceived apart from a conceptual level, since speech sound can only be delineated in terms of such a level; but there can be no raw con- A second device used by speakers is the alphabet. This is a prime example of a lay metalinguistic device, because it provides a manageable set of objects with which most people are familiar, by virtue of an education which has taught them this set precisely in terms of its connection to oral speech. Thus the alphabet emerges as an entirely separate domain of metalinguistic devices which appear inherently to include the notion of an essential connection between speech and writing. The objects have a convenient "order"; they can be "recited" in a completely conventional and universally recognizable manner; and they each have names that allow them to be referred to, and which thus give them an extra dimension of manipulability. The alphabet gives speakers an easy set of tools for directly managing speech.
A third concept is a kind of loosened and expanded version of the alphabet, the strictly visual form of which is the rebus. Here, instead of the restricted set of alphabet letters, we have at our disposal the entirety of things and concepts for which there are words. Here, by contrast with the alphabet, there is no conventional order or homogeneity of visual form; however, the notion of similarity of sound between metalinguistic object-name and pronounced item in the language is fundamental. Whereas the stringing together of homophonous items is a kind of "spelling," the items which spell are designed to be in a relationship of identity with what is spelled. The success of this device depends on familiarity with the meaning attaching to the sound of the metalinguistic object-name. Thus it is useless to adduce the sound of beret if interlocutors have never heard of one; they will need directions how to pronounce that word as well.
A fourth concept available as a metalinguistic device is that of norm. Without a norm ("If they make a mistake, they make a mistake. Don't worry about it!"), anything people say -which will then be regulated for purely practical reasons -will be accepted without comment, and there will remain 420 Language in Society 25:3 (1996) nothing "linguistic" to talk about. Without the "tyranny of the alphabet" (Harris 1986, Ch. 2), it may be that the mere oral imitation of others would provide a sufficient basis for successful communication. That is, the ability and propensity to imitate or repeat the sound of what someone has uttered would be taken as a linguistic universal (cf. Love 1990:99 ff., who makes a slightly different point). Perhaps it is only when speakers are distracted by the question "How would that be spelled?" that their confidence in their purely oral ability is shaken. Be this as it may, it remains the case that we operate verbally with constant appeal to a norm; hence we conceive of what people say, and how they say it, as "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad."
A fifth useful concept is that of silence -which in many cases, can be used as a way of managing communicational exchange. In the case of an ignored mispronunciation, silence can serve to further the communication by preventing it from being disrupted. Or silence may be used in another way, as goading an interlocutor into self-correction. Silence can communicate assumptions, as when an unforthcoming but expected response prompts a reevaluation. Silence can protect. In the case of names, silence can also be used as an index of failure; a lack of response may mean a failed pronunciation.
The above discussion is designed to provide evidence that pronunciation embodies the action of uttering sound as mediated by an interrelated network of normative concepts in the possession of speakers. The interpenetration of the subjective with the objective informs every aspect of the study. There was no possibility of treating bearers as "neutral agents of information," or interviews with them as a kind of ore from which we could separate out the pure metal of scientific fact from the slag of informants' views about their own linguistic behavior. Rather, the facts were in part constituted by bearers' views of their own and others' linguistic behavior. Here the situation is the reverse of Labov's "observer's paradox," according to which one expects knowledge to be gained by observing certain facts, while in reality any knowledge of those facts is taken out of the realm of accessibility precisely by virtue of their being observed (Labov 1972:61-62, 209 ). For us, by contrast, the facts are constituted in and by the process of observation, and by virtue of the interaction between interviewer and bearer, as between bearer and interlocutor generally. In a sense, they are negotiated; but more than this, they are created in and by communication itself, involving as they do the network of concepts by virtue of which people communicate. NOTES * We are grateful to Sheila Embleton, Dennis Preston, and William Bright for many helpful suggestions which have led to our improving the contents and organization of this article.
' Boldface type indicates that the name can be found in the Appendix. Both in the text and the Appendix, when a stress mark is missing from the phonetic transcription, this means that the placement of stress in the pronunciation could not be determined. 25:3 (1996) 421
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